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Abstract
Social identity has been shown to successfully enhance cooperation and effort in cooperation and
coordination games. Little is known about the causal effect of social identity on the propensity
to engage in group conflict. In this paper we explore theoretically and experimentally whether
social identity increases investments in group contests. We show theoretically that increased
social identity with the own group implies higher investments in Tullock contests. Empirically
we find that induced social identity does increase group closeness but does not increase conflict
investments.
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1 Introduction
Social identity is considered an increasingly important concept for teams, organizations, and na-
tions to align interests and create group cohesion. Sports psychology suggests that social identity
is increased more in winning football teams than in losing ones (Murrell and Gaertner, 1992), that
social identity increases higher order identity in Rugby teams and that it can be used to create
a more prosocial environment and increase participation in exercise classes (Beauchamp and Eys,
2014). Corporations use social identity in their branding as employers as well as in advertisement
campaigns. For instance, Apple’s ‘Get a Mac’ campaign built on ingroup and outgroup differenti-
ation to convince consumers that they want to belong to the ingroup and thus buy the companies
product (Dooley, 2012). Social identity also plays an important role in managing organizations
and departments. Ashforth and Mael (1989) discuss that social identity can lead to conflicts be-
tween corporate subunits in companies and to decisions that are not in the best interest of the
organization as a whole. On a country level, national identity is an important ingredient for social
solidarity and political mobilization but also plays an important part in many conflicts between
countries (Greenfeld and Chirot, 1994; Ashmore et al., 2001).1
The reported field evidence is suggestive for a causal link from social identity to conflict behavior.
However, the interactions observed in the field are dynamic and thus reverse causality cannot be
excluded. In this paper we use economic experiments to test whether social identity causally
influences behavior in a conflict situation. Specifically, experiment participants take part in a
Tullock group contest game, modeled after Tullock (1980) and Katz et al. (1990), where two
groups compete for a prize by investing in a contest. The prize is fixed and thus does not increase
with investment, but it does increase the probability of winning the prize. The social optimum
would be to not invest at all as the prize would then be randomly allocated between groups with
equal chances and both groups could keep their initial endowment. The Nash equilibrium in the
contest game implies a strictly positive investment. In such a setting, experiments find significant
overexpenditure compared to the Nash prediction in group contests with symmetric groups (Ahn
et al., 2011; Abbink et al., 2010). Abbink et al. (2012) suggest that the observed over-contribution
is due to parochial altruism, a combination of ingroup love and outgroup spite.2
To test the potential effect of social identity on contest investment we implement two treatments.
In the social identity treatment participants are first exposed to a social identity task as in Chen
1Kelman (2001) describes his experiences from workshops on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and argues that the
conflict is perceived in zero-sum terms not only in disputes over territory and resources but also in terms of national
identity and existence. Kelman suggests that to solve the conflict, the identities of the two nations have to evolve
beyond zero-sum terms in which affirmation of the identity of one country means negation of the identity of the other
nation.
2A recent overview of the literature on experimental contest games can be found in Dechenaux et al. (2015).
and Chen (2011) before they take part in a group contest where two groups of three players have
to compete for the prize. In a control treatment participants also take part in the contest game but
no social identity is induced. Using a social preferences model of social identity we show that in
the Nash equilibrium investments are increasing with stronger social identity with the own group.
In the experiment we find that inducing social identity leads to an increase in perceived closeness
to the group. We do however not find an effect of induced social identity on contest investment
behavior.
Next to the work on contest games cited above, our paper is also related to the recent stream
of experimental work on the effect of social identity on behavior in coordination and public goods
games. (Eckel and Grossman, 2005) and (Chen and Chen, 2011) find that social identity can
help to increase effort levels and achieve higher welfare in public good and minimum effort games,
respectively. In dictator games and two-player response games, Chen and Li (2009) have shown
that social identity increases charity concerns and decreases envy towards ingroup members and
increases the choice of social welfare maximizing outcomes. Charness et al. (2006) show that making
group membership salient significantly increases the choice of an aggressive stance in the battle of
the sexes and leads to more defections in the prisoners dilemma game. This kind of aggression
towards the outgroup was also found by Bicskei et al. (2016) who use a public good game to show
that individuals show higher negative reciprocity towards outgroup members than ingroup members
and that anger-like emotions play a bigger role when they are matched with outgroup members.
For group conflicts social psychologists such as Sherif et al. (1961), Tajfel (1970) or Stein (1976)
show that external conflict with other groups increases group cohesion. These studies do however
not examine whether the increased group cohesion and stronger social identity also increases the
propensity to engage in conflict.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the equilibrium strategies and presents hypotheses. Section 4 covers the empirical
analysis. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results and concludes.
2 Experimental setup
In the following the social identity manipulation from Chen and Chen (2011) is adapted to a Tullock
group contest game to study the effect of social identity on group conflict behavior. Two treatments
were conducted, one with enhanced social identity and one control treatment. In both treatments,
there are five stages. The first stage is an introduction stage in which subjects familiarize themselves
with the contest game. The second stage is the group assignment stage. The third stage is the Klee
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and Kandinsky problem solving stage. The fourth stage is a group contest game that is played over
multiple period. The fifth stage consists of a questionnaire. While all subjects participate in all of
the stages, the second, third and fifth stage differ between treatments.3
Stage 1: Introduction to Contest Game
The group contest game used in the experiment is structured in the following way: Players receive
an endowment of 100 and decide how much of the endowment they want to invest in the contest
game. Endowment that is not invested is added to their account. Investments of group members of
group A are labeled ia where A = {1, 2, 3} and a ∈ A, analogously investments of group B follows.
For group A the probability of winning the contest is all investments of group A over the sum of
all investments by the two groups: pA(
∑
a∈A ia,
∑
b∈B ib) =
∑
a∈A ia∑
a∈A ia+
∑
b∈B ib
. If no one invests the
probability of winning is 12 . The contest prize is z and is equally split among all group members of
the winning group. Thus if Group A is the winning group, every group member gets an individual
payoff of zNA which with z = 300 and group sizes of 3 is 100. Each unit of investment is equivalent
to a lottery ticket and at the end of the round one ticket is drawn from the investment pool of
lottery tickets to decide who won the contest. Thus the more investments are made by a group,
the higher the chance to win the contest. The individual payoff function can be written as:
pig(
∑
a∈A ia,
∑
b∈B ib) =
ig +
∑
a∈A\g
ia
ig +
∑
a∈A\g
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
· z
NA
− ig
Where g is a member of group A and ig ∈∑a∈A . The payoff of g is thus the expected individual
payoff of winning the contest minus the investments made by the individual group member g.
To make sure that participants understand the game, several questions about randomly gener-
ated hypothetical game situations were asked. This stage was not incentivized and subjects were
informed that they do not yet interact with other subjects. The first question asked how many lot-
tery tickets the own group bought when the subject bought x tickets and all other group members
bought the same amount. The amount of tickets x was randomized. The next three questions were
based on the same x and asked the subjects what the winning probability of their group, the other
group and the individual expected payoff for themselves was, given that the other group invested
the same total amount as their own group. The next three questions were identical to the previous
three but the game situation was now such that the subject was the only one who invested and all
other group members and members of the other group did not invest anything.
3The full set of instructions and screen-shots of the experiment can be found in the on-line appendix.
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Stage 2: Group Assignment
In the group assignment stage, all participants were randomly assigned to a group. Participants
in the social identity treatment were assigned to a group color and informed about it whereas
participants in the control treatment were not informed about their group assignment before the
contest game. In the instructions, subjects from the social identity treatment were informed that
they are matched with a group of the other color in the contest game. The groups stayed the same
throughout the experiment.
Stage 3: Klee and Kandinsky Task
Each subject was given five minutes to review five pairs of paintings by Wassily Kandinsky and
Paul Klee.4 The subjects also got an answer key that indicates which artist painted which painting.
After the 5 minute period subjects were shown two more painting of Klee and Kandinsky.5 They
had to determine for each painting if it was painted by Klee or Kandinsky. An additional five
minutes are given for this task and subjects are allowed to communicate with their group via an
online chat program in the social identity treatment. The control treatment is identical except for
the chat function which is not made available. The decision input can only be made after the five
minutes are over. Each correct answer earns ten experimental currency units. Participants are not
informed about the result of this stage until the end of the experiment.6
Stage 4: Group Contest
In the contest stage, subjects play the group contest for 15 periods. After each round they are
informed which group won, how much each group member of their group invested, how much the
other group invested in total and what the probability of winning the contest was for their group.
At the end of the last period, one of the rounds is randomly selected and paid out. Subjects get
the information which round was selected, how much they earned in that round, how much they
earned in the picture task and how much they will get paid out.7
4The paintings are the same as in Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011): Gebirgsbildung, 1924, by
Klee; Subdued Glow, 1928, by Kandinsky; Dreamy Improvisation, 1913, by Kandinsky; Warning of the Ships, 1917,
by Klee; Dry-Cool Garden, 1921, by Klee; Landscape with Red Splashes I, 1913, by Kandinsky; Gentle Ascent, 1934,
by Kandinsky; A Hoffmannesque Tale, 1921, by Klee; Development in Brown, 1933, by Kandinsky; The Vase, 1938,
by Klee.
5Monument in Fertile Country, 1929, by Klee; Start, 1928, by Kandinsky.
6This variant of the Klee and Kandinsky task was chosen based on findings by Chen and Li (2009) who compare
group assignment based on picture preferences and random groups and chat/no chat treatments. The findings suggest
that there is no significant difference between the random and preference based group assignment. However, random
groups are preferable to get probabilistic equivalent groups and avoid unwanted dynamics that results from shared
attributes in the preference based groups.
7Although there is some debate on which mechanism to use to pay subjects, payment of a randomly selected round
was chosen because the random selection mechanism is the only incentive compatible mechanism under monotonicity
as shown by Azrieli et al. (2012). Further validation of the random selection mechanism can be found in Cubitt et al.
(1998) and Laury (2005) among others.
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Stage 5: Survey
At the end of each session, subjects have to fill in a questionnaire which contains questions about
demographics, strategies used, group affiliation, prior knowledge of paintings and risk preference
amongst others. The questions are explained in more detail in the results section.
The experiment was conducted in June 2015 at the BEElab at Maastricht University. After
the introduction in a separate meeting room, subjects were visually and physically separated from
each other. A print out of the the instructions was provided at the desk. Overall six sessions
were conducted. Per session, half of the participants were allocated to the control and half were
allocated to the social identity treatment. In total 126 subjects participated in 42 groups implying
21 independent observations, 10 for the control treatment and 11 for the social identity treatment.
Each experiment session lasted about one hour. The experiment was conducted with the software
z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were invited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The subject
pool mainly consists of students from Maastricht University. Participants were allowed to only
participated in one sessions and treatment. Due to a recording error two groups contained a total
of 3 subjects that had participated in an earlier session. Both groups as well as their matched
counterparts are not used for the statistical analysis and discussion in the main text. The exchange
rate of experimental currency units to euros was 10 ECU = e1. Participants earned on average
e14.5. Subjects in the social identity treatment earned on average e14.7 whereas control treatment
subjects earned e14.3.
3 Theory and Hypotheses
Assuming standard preferences and common knowledge of rationality, the contest game has multiple
equilibria at the individual player level but a unique equilibrium at the group level. In the following
we shall therefore focus on the group level equilibrium. For the parameters of our experiment the
Nash Equilibrium implies that ∑
a∈A
ia =
∑
b∈B
ib = 25.8
In order to account for social identity in the model we closely follow the work of Charness
and Rabin (2002), Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011) who use a utility function
that is a weighted average of own and others’ payoffs. We adopt the utility function of the form:
ug(i) = α·pig+(1−α)·p¯iA\g, where pig is the payoff of player g, p¯iA\g is the average payoff of player g’s
other group members and α is the weight on own payoffs that depends on social identity.9. Based
on Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011), α is expected to be lower in the enhanced social
8See Appendix A for a full derivation of this result.
9We assume that the weight α is strictly positive and larger than 0.1. For values below 0.1 there is no internal
solution. See Appendix A for a discussion of this.
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identity treatment than in the control treatment as the subjects play with an enhanced ingroup
instead of random strangers and thus put more weight on others’ payoffs.
Applied to the contest game this assumption translates into the following payoff function of a
player g in group A:
ug(
∑
a∈A
ia,
∑
b∈B
ib) = α ·

∑
a∈A
ia∑
a∈A
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
· z
NA
− ig
+
(1− α) · ( 1
NA − 1)
(NA − 1) ·
∑
a∈A
ia∑
a∈A
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
· z
NA
−
∑
a∈A\g
ia

It can be shown that, in equilibrium, group contributions decrease in α, the weight put on own
payoffs.10 As we associate a decrease in α with the enhanced social identity treatment, the first
hypothesis regarding the effect of social identity on subject and group behavior in the contest game
is as follows.
Hypothesis 1: The average contribution in the social identity treatment is greater than in the
control treatment.
It is also expected that subjects who contribute more to the chat feel more attached to their
group members, and thus should have a lower weight on own payoffs. This again would result in
an increase in contributions.
Hypothesis 2: The contribution of subjects that participate more actively in the chat is higher
than for subject who participate less actively in the chat.
The null hypothesis is that behavior does not differ between the treatments.
4 Results
We first provide descriptive statistics and analyze the group level data for which we derived a
theoretical prediction. In the subsequent analysis we investigate the individual level contribution
decision with additional information that we collected in a post-experiment questionnaire.
4.1 Contributions on Group Level
Figure 1 presents the average group contributions over time per treatment together with the stan-
dard preferences group level Nash equilibrium. Group contributions in both treatments start of at
approximately 90 and are slightly higher in the social identity treatment for the first six rounds.
10See Appendix A for a full derivation of the equilibrium and a discussion of the comparative statics.
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Contributions are declining in both treatments after round six but the downward trend in the
social identity treatment is more pronounced. In the last period, average contributions in the
control treatment have decreased towards 80 whereas the average contributions in the social iden-
tity treatments have decreased below 50. Average group contributions are well above the standard
Figure 1: Average Group Contribution
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Nash equilibrium in all periods. The contribution behavior within treatments is very heterogeneous
across groups but the groups in the social identity treatment seem to follow a more pronounced
downward trend.11
In the following tests we use independent observations which are average group contributions
per group pair. To test if the differences between treatments are significant, the Fisher-Pitman test
for independent samples is used. The Fisher-Pitman test for independent samples’ null hypothesis
is that there is no difference in the mean of the two samples it tests.12 Table 1 presents the summary
statistics for the group contributions in total and per treatment together with the Fisher-Pitman
p-values. The mean group contributions in the social identity and control treatment are 85.17 and
93.58 respectively. The difference between the two treatments is relatively small compared to the
standard deviations of 34.43 and 36.30 within both treatments. The difference between treatments
is statistically not significant.
11Graphs for individual group behavior are provided in Appendix B.
12The Fisher-Pitman tests work like the more commonly Wilcoxon rank-sum and the Mann-Whitney-U test
but do not transform the data into ranks. This allows the Fisher-Pitman tests to not only consider the sign of
the differences between observations but also the size of the difference. For an explanation of the method and
comparison with Wilcoxon and Mann-Whitney-U see Siegel and Castellan (1988). For a more recent discussion and
STATA implementation see Kaiser (2007). All hypothesis tests were also conducted with the respective Wilcoxon
and Mann.Whitney-U tests as robustness check but rejections and non-rejections were identical to the Fisher-Pitman
tests.
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We also compare contributions in the first five, the sixth to tenth and eleventh to fifteenth
round as social identity could fade out over time and thus comparing overall averages might distort
the effect. While means and standard deviations are similar between treatments when only the
group contributions over periods one to five and six to teen are considered, this is not the case for
the last periods. The mean group contribution in the social identity treatment is 62.33 whereas
contributions in the control treatment are still at a high level of 88.80 when only the last five
rounds are considered. The standard deviation in the control is 52.27 and higher than the 36.38
in the social identity treatment. When considering period 15 only, the mean group contribution in
the social identity treatment is 48.72 and 81.30 in the control. However, none of the tests report
significant differences between the treatments, as there is large heterogeneity between the groups
that results in very high standard deviations. These results fail to support Hypothesis 1, that
inducing social identity increases contributions.
We also analyze rent dissipation in the different treatments and time periods. By deducting the
standard preferences Nash Equilibrium contribution level from the group contributions we derive
a measure for how much of the resources are dissipated relative to the standard Nash Equilibrium.
The Fisher-Pitman test for paired replicates is used to test if rent dissipation is significantly dif-
ferent from zero. Table 2 reports the rent-dissipation on group level. In line with the previous
Table 1: Group Level Contributions
Average group contribution Control Social identity Fisher-Pitman
per group pair (N=10) (N=9) p-value*
All periods 93.58 84.17 0.6085
(36.30) (34.43)
Periods 1-5 98.45 102.52 0.7760
(29.75) (31.20)
Periods 6-10 93.49 90.68 0.8779
(39.93) (41.24)
Periods 11-15 88.80 62.33 0.2238
(52.27) (36.38)
Period 15 81.30 48.72 0.1214
(45.26) (42.04)
Standard deviation in parentheses; * two-tailed Fisher-Pitman test for independent samples with null
Hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean of the two treatments
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literature on contest games, it is found that contribution levels in both treatments over all periods
are significantly higher than what the standard Nash equilibrium would predict. The mean rent
dissipation over all periods, which is the mean distance between group contribution and Nash equi-
librium is 60.17 in the social identity treatment and 68.58 in the control treatment. When only the
last period is considered rent dissipation is 23.72 in the social identity treatment and 56.30 in the
control treatment.
There is no difference between the group contributions in the social identity treatment and the
Nash equilibrium when only the last round is considered. In the control treatment the test is still
rejected. This suggests that contributions in the social identity treatment converge to the Nash
equilibrium whereas contributions in the control treatment stay fairly above it. However, as the
minimum rent dissipation in the social identity treatment is negative, thus undershooting the Nash
Equilibrium, this could also be a continued downward trend towards zero.
Table 2: Group Rent Dissipation
Average group rent dissipation Mean Standard Deviation Fisher-Pitman
per group pair p-value*
All periods 64.6 34.70 <0.001
Control Treatment 68.58 36.30 0.004
Social identity Treatment 60.17 34.43 0.002
Period 15 40.87 45.70 0.001
Control Treatment 56.30 45.26 0.02
Social identity Treatment 23.72 42.04 0.13
Standard deviation in parentheses; * two-tailed Fisher-Pitman test for paired replicates with null Hypothesis
that rent dissipation is equal to zero.
4.2 Individual Contribution Decision
To analyze the individual contribution decision we run four random-effects regressions of the indi-
vidual contribution with standard errors that are clustered per competing group-pair.13 The first
column of Table 3 shows the result of a simple regression with period-trend, treatment dummy and
an interaction term as explanatory variables and individual contributions as dependent variable.
The treatment dummy is not significant which is in line with the findings from the group level
13An exploratory analysis of the effect of the controls is provided in Appendix C, summary statistics are provided
in the on-line appendix.
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analysis. The period-trend and the interaction term have a negative coefficient but both are not
significant.
To control for personal characteristics and dynamics that develop during the experiment, we
include the control questions from the post experiment questionnaire as well as lagged average
contribution of the other group members and lagged average contribution of the opposing group in
the following regressions. For the regression in the second column that includes observations from
both treatments we also include interactions between the treatment dummy and the lagged terms
to account possible differences in game dynamics between the two treatments. The results for the
second regression show that controlling for personal characteristics and game dynamics does not
change the significance of the negative trend or the treatment dummy. The interaction between
trend and social identity treatment does become significant at a 5% level, which is in line with the
observation from the group level analysis that there seems the be a negative trend in the social
identity treatment that is absent in the control treatment. The lagged contribution of the own
and the opposing group are significant at 1% and 5% with the lagged contribution of the other
group members having a larger effect than the contribution of the opposing group. The lagged
contributions that are interacted with the treatment dummy are not significant. Thus individuals
seem to adjust their own contribution more based on the contribution of the other group members
than on the contribution of the opponent.
For the test of the second hypothesis, two of the additional individual attributes are of special
interest. One of them is the closeness to the group which is measured by a questionnaire question
that asks the subjects to rate how closely they felt attached to their group on a 1 to 10 scale,
where 1 is "Not close at all" and 10 is "Very close". The second variable is chat activity which is
the number of chat messages that subjects sent during the social identity task. Both variables are
not significant, with the interaction of the two terms being not significant as well. These results
do not support hypothesis 2 that chatting increases contributions, as we would expect chatting to
lead to a higher group cohesion and thus a positive effect of the interaction between closeness and
chat activity on contribution.
For the third and fourth regression, the data set was split into the control and social identity
treatment and each treatment was analyzed on its own. The negative period-trend is only significant
in the social identity treatment, supporting the observation from the group level analysis that the
contribution in the social identity treatment is decreasing stronger than the control treatment.
Closeness and chat activity remain not significant. The lagged contribution of the other group
members and the opponent’s contribution decrease in significance in the analysis of the single
treatments but the size and the sign of the coefficient stays in a similar range, suggesting that this
is caused by the decrease in the number of observations.
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Table 3: Individual Contribution Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables All All Control Social Identity
Social Identity 4.685 5.851
(5.340) (5.766)
Period-trend -0.354 -0.278 -0.281 -1.020***
(0.488) (0.269) (0.283) (0.244)
Social Identity*Period-trend -0.936 -0.737*
(0.549) (0.348)
Lag contribution of other group members 0.200*** 0.193*** 0.116**
(0.0362) (0.0386) (0.0364)
Social Identity*Lag contr. o. group members -0.0864
(0.0502)
Lag contribution of opposing group 0.0486* 0.0491* 0.0618
(0.0196) (0.0205) (0.0324)
Social Identity*Lag contr. o. group 0.0167
(0.0383)
Closeness to group 0.320 0.380 -0.730
(0.538) (0.630) (0.639)
Chat activity 0.202 0.418
(0.515) (0.469)
Chat*Closeness -0.0110 -0.0285
(0.0782) (0.111)
Constant 34.03*** 14.49** 11.41 27.92***
(3.829) (5.524) (8.659) (7.415)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
N 1710 1596 840 756
Overall R2 0.039 0.362 0.391 0.419
Standard errors clustered per group-pair in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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As robustness check, we also run the regressions with period dummies and interactions of period
dummies and the treatment variable but there is no significant difference in the results.14
4.3 Success of Social Identity Manipulation
As the missing significant effect of the social identity treatment on group level contributions could
be the result of a failure of the social identity manipulation, it is worthwhile to take a closer look
at the data from the Klee and Kandinsky task. While not a perfect measure for the success of
the manipulation, a comparison of the answers that participants gave to the questionnaire question
that asks subjects to rate how closely attached they felt to their group can give some insight on
this. If the manipulation is indeed successful in creating a social identity, subjects in the social
identity treatment are expected to feel closer attached to their groups than subjects from the control
treatment. Table 4 shows the average closeness overall as well as per group. The difference in mean
is nearly a whole point on the 1 to 10 scale used in the questionnaire. While the maximum average
closeness is similar across treatments the minimum average closeness is 3.00 in the social identity
treatment whereas it is only 1.67 in the control treatment.
A Fisher-Pitman test for independent samples on the average closeness in each group shows
that closeness was rated weakly significant higher at a 10% level in the social identity treatment
than in the control treatment suggesting that the social identity manipulation had some success.15
Table 4: Summary Statistics Closeness
Control Social Identity Fisher-Pitman
(N=20) (N=18) p-value*
Average closeness to group 4.42 5.26 0.0832
(1.63) (1.20)
Standard deviation in parentheses; * two-tailed Fisher-Pitman test for independent samples
with null Hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean of the two treatments.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, the effect of social identity on conflict is experimentally investigated using a contest
game. While the effect of social identity in economic games has been studied in the context of
public good and minimum effort games before, it has not been extended to games where maximum
14The alternative regressions are provided in Appendix C.
15Histograms provided in Appendix D.
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engagement is detrimental to social welfare. A social preference function that depends on social
identity similar to the utility functions used by Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011)
is applied to the game to derive equilibrium solutions and comparative statics results. Social
identity is induced by using Chen and Chen (2011)’s variant of the Klee-Kandinsky painting task
to increase group contributions in a group contest game. By letting subjects solve a task with
group communication groups are made salient but this fails to enhance group contributions. Group
contributions are not significantly different from the control treatment which is not in line with
the theory and previous findings on the positive effect of social identity on effort and contribution
in coordination and public good games. Group contributions in the social identity treatment
seem to follow a negative trend that is not prevalent in the control treatment. Looking at the
individual contribution decision of subjects supports the finding that contributions in the social
identity treatment are decreasing at a faster rate than in the control treatment. There is no
indication that chatting or closeness have an effect on individual contributions.
The reason for the negative trend in the social identity treatment is open for speculation. It could
be argued that subjects have higher expectations in other group members after bonding with them in
the Klee and Kandinsky task and are than more disappointed when those expectations are not met,
leading to more free-riding. The theoretical model employed in this paper suggests that if beliefs
are introduced and subjects believe that other members of the own group increase contributions,
it would be a best response to decrease the own contributions. An increase in contributions due
to a higher weight on the payoffs of other group members could than be canceled out by the
belief that other group members contribute more and the aggregated effect could become negative.
Furthermore, if subjects were to believe that the members of the other group are completely unselfish
and are also unselfish themselves, the comparative statics suggest that equilibrium contributions
would not change with changes in social identity. This highlights the need for more research of
the interaction of beliefs and social identity and especially of situations in which changes in beliefs
might cause an effect that is opposed to the expected effect of a change in social preferences.
The social identity manipulation that is employed in the study closely follows the design em-
ployed by Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011) who found a significant effect of identity
on behavior. The results of our study resonate with some recent evidence that shows that social
identity in the lab might be harder to induce than earlier papers suggested. Camerer et al. (2016)
fail to replicate Chen and Chen (2011) and Guala and Filippin (2015) show widely inconsistent
effects of social identity across different contexts in modified dictator games. While the fact that
we find a weakly significant higher closeness in the social identity treatment is supporting evidence
that the Klee and Kandinsky task is effective in enhancing social identity, we do not find that
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closeness or chatting have an effect on contributions. Some of the controls hint at a heterogeneous
effect of the social identity manipulation. First, there is a large standard deviation in how help-
ful subjects perceived the chat and, second, there is a significant positive effect of indicating the
willingness to maximize group payoff in the social identity treatment that is absent in the control
treatment. This could mean that the interaction between a group has to have a certain qualitative
level that is also perceived as such by the subjects to achieve significant identity effects in the lab
and that the social identity manipulation has only an effect on those who were willing to maximize
the group payoff anyway. The lack of a unified approach to measure social identity in the lab that
is capable of quantifying the success of a social identity manipulation without drastically altering
the experimental design makes it difficult to identify if our manipulation failed or if the problem
lies in the structure of the game itself.
A possible explanation for the missing effect of social identity on contributions in our setting
that is based on the game structure and not on the social identity manipulation is a plateau effect.
As contributions in the baseline setting are already well above the standard Nash predictions and
an outside threat has been found to increase in-group cooperation, social identity could be less
effective in enhancing group cooperation because the setup of the contest game itself could already
be a strong social identity manipulation. If there are diminishing marginal returns to social identity
enhancements it would not be surprising to find no or only a very small effect of the social identity
manipulation when the social identity created through the group contest is already strong. An
interesting path for future research would be to follow up on this and reverse the research questions
to investigate the effect that the group contest setting has on social identity, as there might be a
circular relationship in which the contest induces social identity, which increases contributions and
escalates the conflict which leads to an even stronger identity and a further increase in contributions.
14
References
Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., and Orzen, H. (2010). Intergroup conflict and intra-group
punishment in an experimental contest game. The American Economic Review, 100(1):420–447.
Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., and Orzen, H. (2012). Parochial altruism in inter-group
conflicts. Economics Letters, 117(1):45–48.
Ahn, T., Isaac, R. M., and Salmon, T. C. (2011). Rent seeking in groups. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 29(1):116–125.
Ashforth, B. E. and Mael, F. (1989). Social identity theory and the organization. The Academy of
Management Review, 14(1):pp. 20–39.
Ashmore, R. D., Jussim, L., et al. (2001). Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduc-
tion, volume 3. Oxford University Press, USA.
Azrieli, Y., Chambers, C. P., and Healy, P. J. (2012). Incentives in experiments: A theoretical
analysis. Working Paper.
Beauchamp, M. R. and Eys, M. A. (2014). Group dynamics in exercise and sport psychology,
volume 2. Routledge.
Bicskei, M., Lankau, M., and Bizer, K. (2016). Negative reciprocity and its relation to anger-like
emotions in identity-homogeneous and -heterogeneous groups. Journal of Economic Psychology,
54:17 – 34.
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Forsell, E., Ho, T.-H., Huber, J., Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M.,
Almenberg, J., Altmejd, A., Chan, T., Heikensten, E., Holzmeister, F., Imai, T., Isaksson, S.,
Nave, G., Pfeiffer, T., Razen, M., and Wu, H. (2016). Evaluating replicability of laboratory
experiments in economics. Science.
Charness, G. and Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly
journal of Economics, pages 817–869.
Charness, G., Rigotti, L., and Rustichini, A. (2006). Individual behavior and group membership.
Available at SSRN 894685.
Chen, R. and Chen, Y. (2011). The potential of social identity for equilibrium selection. American
Economic Review, 101:2562–2589.
15
Chen, Y. and Li, S. X. (2009). Group identity and social preferences. American Economic Review,
99(1):431–457.
Cubitt, R. P., Starmer, C., and Sugden, R. (1998). On the validity of the random lottery incentive
system. Experimental Economics, 1(2):115–131.
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., and Sheremeta, R. M. (2015). A survey of experimental research on
contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics, 18(4):609–669.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J., and Wagner, G. G. (2011). Individ-
ual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and behavioral consequences. Journal of the
European Economic Association, 9(3):522–550.
Dooley, R. (2012). Build loyalty like apple: Define your enemy. http://www.forbes.com/sites/
rogerdooley/2012/07/17/apple-enemy/. Accessed: 2015-07-30.
Eckel, C. C. and Grossman, P. J. (2005). Managing diversity by creating team identity. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 58(3):371–392.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental
economics, 10(2):171–178.
Greenfeld, L. and Chirot, D. (1994). Nationalism and aggression. Theory and society, 23(1):79–130.
Greiner, B. (2004). The online recruitment system orsee 2.0-a guide for the organization of exper-
iments in economics. University of Cologne, Working paper series in economics, 10(23):63–104.
Guala, F. and Filippin, A. (2015). The effect of group identity on distributive choice: Social
preference or heuristic? The Economic Journal.
Kaiser, J. (2007). An exact and a monte carlo proposal to the fisher–pitman permutation tests for
paired replicates and for independent samples. Stata Journal, 7(3):402–412.
Katz, E., Nitzan, S., and Rosenberg, J. (1990). Rent-seeking for pure public goods. Public Choice,
65(1):49–60.
Kelman, H. C. (2001). The role of national identity in conflict resolution. Social identity, intergroup
conflict, and conflict reduction, 3:187.
Konrad, K. A. (2009). Strategy and dynamics in contests. OUP Catalogue.
16
Laury, S. (2005). Pay one or pay all: Random selection of one choice for payment. Andrew Young
School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series, (06-13).
Murrell, A. J. and Gaertner, S. L. (1992). Cohesion and sport team effectiveness: The benefit of a
common group identity. Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 16(1):1–14.
Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., Sherif, C. W., et al. (1961). Intergroup
conflict and cooperation: The Robbers Cave experiment, volume 10. University Book Exchange
Norman, OK.
Siegel, S. and Castellan, N. (1988). Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. McGraw-
Hill international editions. Statistics series. McGraw-Hill.
Stein, A. A. (1976). Conflict and cohesion a review of the literature. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
20(1):143–172.
Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientific American, 223(5):96–102.
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, chapter 10,
pages 97–112. Texas A & M University Press.
17
APPENDICES
A Equilibrium Strategies and Social Identity
The following sections presents theoretical predictions and equilibrium strategies. The game is first
analyzed without considering social preferences. Then an extension to incorporate social identity
and comparative statics are provided.
A.1 Equilibrium Strategy without social preferences
To derive the Nash equilibrium for group contributions, the first order condition of the payoff
functions of individual g of group A is considered.
max
ig
pig(
∑
a∈A ia,
∑
b∈B ib) =
ig +
∑
a∈A\g
ia
ig +
∑
a∈A\g
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
· z
NA
− ig
Taking the derivative with respect to ig delivers the first order condition:
∂pig(
∑
a∈A ia,
∑
b∈B ib)
∂(ig)
= 0⇒
∑
b∈B
ib( ∑
a∈A
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
)2 · zNA − 1 = 0
To assure that this is a maximum, the second derivative is considered:
∂2pig(
∑
a∈A ia,
∑
b∈B ib)
∂2(ig)
=
−2z ∑
a∈A
ia
NA
( ∑
a∈A
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
)3 < 0 ∀∑a∈A ia,∑b∈B ib ∈ ]0, NA ∗ 100]
NA is strictly positive, the contributions of group A and B are both between 0 and NA ∗ 100,
thus the function is concave and the extremum a maximum except for the case where both teams
invest 0.16 It can easily be shown that ∑
a∈A
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib = 0 cannot be a maximum as it is always
optimal to at least invest the minimal positive amount possible when the other Group plays 0 as
this guarantees winning the prize.
16Every individual has an endowment of 100 and group sizes are assumed to be equal thus the maximum group
investment for group B is NB ∗ 100=NA ∗ 100
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The first order condition can be solved for group contributions in group A:17
∑
a∈A
ia =
√∑
b∈B
ib · z
NA
−
∑
b∈B
ib (A.1)
Best response for an individual ib in group B:∑
a∈A
ia( ∑
a∈A
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
)2 · zNB − 1 = 0 (A.2)
Substituting equation (A.1) in equation (A.2) gives:
√∑
b∈B
ib · zNA −
∑
b∈B
ib(√∑
b∈B
ib · zNA −
∑
b∈B
ib +
∑
b∈B
ib
)2 = NBz
⇔
√∑
b∈B
ib · z
NA
−
∑
b∈B
ib =
NB
NA
·
∑
b∈B
ib
⇔
∑
b∈B
ib · z
NA
= (1 + NB
NA
)2(
∑
b∈B
ib)2
⇔
∑
b∈B
ib =
z
NA · (1 + NBNA )2
(A.3)
Substituting equation (A.3) in equation (A.1) gives:
∑
a∈A
ia =
√
z
NA · (1 + NBNA )2
· z
NA
− z
NA · (1 + NBNA )2
⇔
∑
a∈A
ia =
z
NA · (1 + NBNA )
− z
NA · (1 + NBNA )2
⇔
∑
a∈A
ia =
zNB
NA
2 · (1 + NBNA )2
(A.4)
This result is based on the fact that the members of each team have identical valuations and
constant marginal costs of investments and does not require further symmetry assumptions (Abbink
et al., 2010; Konrad, 2009). Furthermore, this result does not imply a unique solution in individual
17This function actually has two solutions, but the second solution always implies a negative investment from
player g, violating the boundary conditions
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contributions as there exist infinitely many equilibria in individual contributions such that they
sum up to the expression on the right hand side. For NA = NB = 3 and z = 300 this gives:
∑
a∈A
ia =
∑
b∈B
ib = 25 (A.5)
However this model does not account for other regarding preferences and especially social iden-
tity.
A.2 Equilibrium strategies with social preferences
The adopted utility function for player g is a weighted average of own payoff and the average payoff
of the other group members.18
ug(
∑
a∈A
ia,
∑
b∈B
ib) = α ·

∑
a∈A
ia∑
a∈A
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
· z
NA
− ig
+
(1− α) · ( 1
NA − 1)
(NA − 1) ·
∑
a∈A
ia∑
a∈A
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
· z
NA
−
∑
a∈A\g
ia

Deriving with respect to ig and setting to zero delivers the individual best response function:
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∂ug(
∑
a∈A
ia,
∑
b∈B
ib)
∂(ig)
= 0⇒
∑
b∈B
ib( ∑
a∈A
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
)2 = αNAz
⇔
∑
a∈A
ia =
√∑
b∈B
ib · z
αNA
−
∑
b∈B
ib (A.6)
The best response function for an individual of group B, where β is the equivalent to α for
group B is: ∑
a∈A
ia( ∑
a∈A
ia +
∑
b∈B
ib
)2 = βNBz (A.7)
Assuming that α and β are identical within the respective groups, substituting equation (A.6)
18Assuming symmetry within the group would reduce the formula to the individual payoff maximization problem
that was discussed in the previous subsection.
19Proof of concavity/maximum is omitted as it is analogous to equation (A.1) and α and β are assumed to be
strictly positive
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in equation (A.7) gives:20 ∑
b∈B
ib =
z
αNA · (1 + βNBαNA )2
(A.8)
Substituting equation (A.8) in equation (A.6) gives:
⇒
∑
a∈A
ia =
βzNB
α2NA
2 · (1 + βNBαNA )2
· (A.9)
Same as in the model without social preferences, this does not imply a unique solution in individual
contributions.
For the parameters used in the experiment this gives:
∑
b∈B
ib =
100
α · (1 + βα)2
(A.10)
∑
a∈A
ia =
β100
α2 · (1 + βα)2
(A.11)
However, as the endowment of each individual is fixed at 100 and all investments have to be
larger than or equal to zero and not bigger than the endowment, the following must hold:
0 ≤ ∑
a∈A
ia ≤ NA ∗ 100
0 ≤ ∑
b∈B
ib ≤ NB ∗ 100
As α,β,z,NB and NA are all either positive or zero, the first part of both inequalities holds
trivially. With the values used in the experiment and using the equilibrium strategies the second
part holds if:
β ≤ 3(α+ β)2
and
α ≤ 3(α+ β)2
Figure A.1 shows the inequality plots for the two equations. The inequalities are only violated
if either, alpha or beta, is smaller then 0.1. The lowest value for the weight on own payoffs that
Chen and Li (2009) find is above 0.5 such that subjects seem to always put at least as much value
on their own payoffs as they put on the payoff of their group members.
As values lower than 0.1 would require extreme altruistic behavior in which a player puts
significantly more weight on other players’ payoff than his own, we will assume that alpha and beta
are at least 0.1 and not violating these inequalities.
20Steps are identical to the model without social preferences
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Figure A.1: Inequality Plots
(White areas indicate violation of the inequalities, x-axis is α and y-axis is β)
A.3 Comparative Statics
Comparative statics with respect to the weighting parameters α and β:
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂α
= − 2βNANBz(αNA + βNB)3 < 0 (A.12)
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂β
= NBz(αNA − βNB)(αNA + βNB)3 ≶ 0 (A.13)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂α
= −NAz(αNA − βNB)(αNA + βNB)3 ≶ 0 (A.14)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂β
= − 2αNANBz(αNA + βNB)3 < 0 (A.15)
For α = β :
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂α
= − NBz
α2(NA +NB)2
< 0 (A.16)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂α
= − NAz
α2(NA +NB)2
< 0 (A.17)
(A.18)
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All of the variables are strictly positive, thus the group contribution of a group is decreasing when
the weight on own payoffs α within the group increases. The relation with the parameter β of
the other group depends on the relation between αNA and βNB with equilibrium contributions of
group A decreasing if αNA < βNB and increasing if the reverse case is true. The opposite holds for
group B. If both groups have the same weighting parameter, contributions are strictly decreasing
in it.
Comparative statics with respect to group sizes:
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂NA
= − 2αβNBz(αNA + βNB)3 < 0 (A.19)
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂NB
= βz(αNA − βNB)(αNA + βNB)3 ≶ 0 (A.20)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂NA
= −αz(αNA − βNB)(αNA + βNB)3 ≶ 0 (A.21)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂NB
= − 2αβNAz(αNA + βNB)3 (A.22)
For α = β :
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂NA
= − 2NBz
α(NA +NB)3
< 0 (A.23)
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂NB
= z(NA −NB)
α2(NA +NB)3
≶ 0 (A.24)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂NA
= z(NB −NA)
α2(NA +NB)3
≶ 0 (A.25)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂NB
= − 2NAz
α(NA +NB)3
< 0 (A.26)
ForNA = NB
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂NA
= − 2βz
N2A(α+ β)2
< 0 (A.27)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂NA
= − 2αz
N2A(α+ β)2
< 0 (A.28)
For NA = NB and α = β :
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂N
= − z4N2α < 0 (A.29)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂N
= − z4N2α < 0 (A.30)
Group contributions are decreasing in own group size but the relation with the group size of
the other group is again dependent on the relation between αNA and βNB. The equilibrium
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contribution of group A is increasing in NB if αNA > βNB and decreasing if the reverse case is
true. The reverse holds for group B. If the weighting parameters are the same in both group,
group contributions are still decreasing in own group size and ambiguous in others’ group size.
However, now it only depends on the difference in group size if the contributions are increasing or
decreasing with the group size of the other group and not on the weighting parameter. If the own
group is bigger than the other group then an increase in the other group results in an increase in
contributions. If the own group is smaller than the other group it will decrease contributions with
increases others’ group size. Assuming that group sizes are equal, both group contributions are
strictly decreasing in group size. In the case that group sizes as well as weighting parameters are
equal, group contributions are decreasing in the weighting parameter.
Comparative Statics with respect to α and β for the case when NA = NB:
For NA = NB
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂α
= − 2βz
N(α+ β)3 < 0 (A.31)
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂β
= z(α− β)
N(α+ β)3 ≶ 0 (A.32)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂α
= z(β − α)
N(α+ β)3 ≶ 0 (A.33)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂β
= − 2αz
N(α+ β)3 < 0 (A.34)
For NA = NB and α = β :
∂
∑
a∈A
ia
∂α
= − z4Nα2 < 0 (A.35)
∂
∑
b∈B
ib
∂α
= − z4Nα2 < 0 (A.36)
As all parameters are strictly positive, it is clear that contributions decrease in the own weighting
parameter. This also implies that an decrease in the own weighting parameter which we associate
with the enhanced social identity treatment leads to an increase in contributions. The relation
between the weighting parameter of the other group and own group contributions does depend on
the relation between α and β. If α is smaller than β, group A’s contributions decrease in β and
group B’s contributions increase in α. If α is bigger than β, the reverse holds true. In the case that
not only group size but also weighting parameters are equal, group contributions are decreasing in
the weighting parameter.
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Figure B.1: Group Contributions Control Treatment
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Figure B.2: Group Contributions Social Identity Treatment
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C Individual characteristics
As the selection into treatments was randomized, we didn’t expect and also didn’t find any ma-
jor differences between the treatments with regards to the descriptive statistics of the individual
characteristics except for a higher number of German and Dutch students in the social identity
treatment.
To measure closeness to group, subjects were asked to answer to rate how closely they felt
attached to their group on a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 is "Not closely at all" and 10 is "Very closely".
The mean is below 5 indicating a tendency towards not being closely attached but the standard
deviation is large.
Subjects in the social identity treatment were also asked how they rated the helpfulness of
the communication in the Klee and Kandinsky task on a 1 to 10 scale. The question is "On a
scale from 1 to 10, please rate how much you think communicating with your group members
helped solve the two extra painting questions, with 1 meaning "not much at all" and 10 meaning
"very much"". The mean response indicates that subjects are slightly leaning towards finding the
communication not very helpful. The distribution of answers has a fat left tail, meaning that there
is a considerable amount of subjects which don’t find the chat function helpful at all. The average
number of messages sent per subject in the social identity treatment is 6.7 with the minimum being
1 and the maximum being 27. Thus all subjects in the social identity treatment submitted at least
one message in the group chat.
To account for previous knowledge of the pictures in the Klee and Kandinsky task, subjects
were asked to rate how familiar they were with the paintings made by Klee and Kandinsky before
the experiment. The scale used in the question is 1 to 10, with 1 meaning "not familiar at all"
and 10 meaning "very familiar". With a mean below 3, most participants seem to be unfamiliar
with the paintings used in the experiment. As the task is not intended to assess the ability to
solve the picture task correctly but about communicating with the group, it is not prohibitive that
some students knew the pictures before. About 26% of the subjects guessed correctly that the
first picture was painted by Kandinsky and 65% of the subjects guessed correctly that the second
additional picture was painted by Klee . In total the average number of correct answers was 0.92.
The English phrasing of the German Socio Economic Panel questionnaire question for general
risk was used to measure risk attitude (Dohmen et al., 2011). The question is "How do you see
yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking
risks?" and subjects answer on a 1 to 10 scale where 1 is "not at all willing to take risks" and 10 is
"very willing to take risks". The mean is very close to the middle of the scale such that the students
in the sample do not seem to be particular risk averse or risk seeking.
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About 62% of the sample is female and and the average age is 21. It is somewhat surprising
that there are so many women in the sample but as it can be controlled for in the regression, this
is not a major concern. The average number of siblings that subjects report is 1.6 and 80% of the
students have between 0 and 2 siblings.
As subjects who are involved in team sports could show different behavior in a group contest
than subjects who never participated in such group activities, the question "Have you been or are
you practicing a team sports?" was included. About 65% of the sample participate or participated
in team sports.
Over half of the students come from Germany or the Netherlands with other European countries
accounting for another 28%. The students from the School of Economics and Business make up
55% of the sample with only University College and Law students also participating in considerable
numbers. 81% of the participants are Bachelor students. These numbers are a good representation
of the subject pool, as most subjects in the pool are from the School of Economics and Business
where most students are either German or Dutch and doing their bachelors degree.
To find out more about the reasoning behind the contribution decisions, subjects were also
asked to indicate which strategies they used. They could chose between "I tried to earn as much
money as possible", "I tried to earn as much money as possible for my group", "I tried to earn as
much money as possible for both groups", "I tried to earn more than my other group members",
"I tried to earn more than everybody else" and "None of the above". Subjects who chose "None of
the above" were asked to give a short explanation of their contribution decisions in a free form text
box. Multiple answers were possible. Of all answers given, 44% are "I tried to earn as much money
as possible" and 38% are "I tried to earn as much money as possible for my group". Maximizing
the payoff of both groups which is equivalent with welfare maximization was only chosen 6 times.
Nearly all of the answers that indicate a desire to earn more than either the group members or the
everyone else were combined with own payoff maximization or the other of the two "earn more than
..." strategies. The most common combination of strategies was "I tried to earn as much money as
possible" and "I tried to earn as much money as possible for my group" which was chosen 23 times
and 4 more times in combination with one or more of the other strategies.
In Table C.1 we report the coefficients for the controls that were not reported in the results
section. Of all the included controls, only being an Economics or Business student, being female,
having tried to maximize the group payoff and not having used any of the given strategies are
significant in at least one of the three regressions. Being an economics or business students has a
significant negative effect in the control group but not in the social identity group. Being female
has a negative coefficient and is significant in the regression that includes both treatments but not
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in the split data sets. Indicating that one played none of the strategies that were suggested in the
questionnaire has a significant negative effect in the control but none in the social identity treatment
group. Indicating that one was trying to maximize the group payoff has a significant positive effect
at a 1% level if both treatments are included in the regression and a positive significant effect at
a 0.1% level in the social identity treatment. There is no such effect in control group. This might
hint at an interaction between the treatment and those who are willing to maximize the group
payoff. Given that the number of subjects that indicated to maximize the group payoff is roughly
equal across the two treatments, this could mean that the social identity treatment only increases
contributions for those subjects, who are already willing to maximize the group payoff and not
only their own. However, comparing the contribution of those who indicated that they chose this
strategy across the two treatment with a Fisher-Pitman test cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the contributions are the same across treatments.21
In Table C.2 we report the result from the regressions with period dummies. The main variables
of interest do not change much between the trend and the dummy models. In the first regression
none of period dummies and interaction terms of period dummies and treatment variable are
significant which is similar to the result with the trend dummy, where neither trend nor interaction
of trend and treatment are significant. Taking into account the other controls makes the 4th and
8th dummy significant at 5% level with a negative coefficient but none of the interaction terms
reaches significance which is mainly due to large standard errors. In the regressions on the separate
treatment data the period dummies have large negative coefficients and are strongly significant
at 1% level from period 11 onwards in the social identity treatment whereas the only significant
dummy in the control treatment is period 8 which has a negative coefficient. This is in line with
the finding of the result section that there is a strong negative trend in the social identity treatment
but not in the control treatment.
21Fisher Pitman permutation test for independent samples.
Ho: Control = Social Identity : p=.86948 (two-tailed)
29
Table C.1: Individual Contribution Decisions Controls
Variables All Control Social Identity
Risk 0.103 0.800 -1.079
(0.692) (0.737) (1.223)
Female -5.994* -6.558 -4.745
(2.964) (4.314) (3.023)
Picture knowledge 0.135 0.0890 0.741
(0.451) (0.771) (0.942)
Teamsports 3.394 2.497 6.393
(3.055) (4.477) (5.079)
Siblings 0.479 2.066 -1.670
(1.548) (2.347) (1.445)
Economics or Business -4.742 -6.945* 0.323
(2.790) (3.158) (3.316)
Master student 1.586 0.814 5.640
(3.315) (4.872) (4.215)
German -1.295 1.270 -5.979
(2.700) (3.196) (3.545)
Dutch -1.425 1.418 -4.340
(3.210) (4.147) (4.845)
S2.Maximizing group payoff 6.631** 4.134 13.31***
(2.449) (4.090) (3.397)
S3.Earn more than group members 2.463 4.851 1.244
(5.283) (10.53) (7.095)
S4.Earn more than everybody else 3.534 9.081 -6.817
(3.888) (5.193) (3.592)
S5.Maximize overall welfare -6.522 -10.03 -10.57
(3.950) (5.848) (7.878)
S6.None of the above -5.909 -11.03* 1.873
(5.210) (4.954) (3.669)
Maximizing own and group payoff 2.147 0.370 2.201
(2.863) (3.618) (3.912)
Constant 14.49** 11.41 27.92***
(5.524) (8.659) (7.415)
N 1596 840 756
Standard errors clustered per group-pair in parentheses
Only controls that were not discussed in the results section are shown
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
30
Table C.2: Individual Contribution Decision with period Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables All All Control Social Identity
Social Identity -0.444 3.102
(3.262) (5.205)
Lag contribution of other group members 0.202*** 0.196*** 0.119**
(0.0365) (0.0390) (0.0450)
Social Identity*Lag contr. o. group members -0.0865
(0.0560)
Lag contribution of opposing group 0.0505* 0.0510* 0.0639*
(0.0204) (0.0213) (0.0272)
Social Identity*Lag contr. opposing group 0.0170
(0.0340)
Closeness to group 0.312 0.375 -0.735
(0.542) (0.636) (0.651)
Chat activity 0.191 0.406
(0.518) (0.487)
Chat*Closeness -0.00968 -0.0274
(0.0787) (0.113)
Constant 31.00*** 15.19** 12.17 25.79***
(1.605) (5.098) (8.163) (7.715)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
N 1710 1596 840 756
Overall R2 0.048 0.368 0.396 0.425
Standard errors clustered per group-pair in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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E Online Appendix
E.1 Instructions
Control treatment:
Experimental Instructions
General Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions care-
fully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to
your cubicle to answer your question in private.
Talking or using mobile phones or any other electronic devices is strictly prohibited. Mobile phones
and other electronic devices should be left in the waiting room or switched off. If you are found
violating these rules, you will both forfeit any earnings from this experiment, and may be excluded
from future experiments as well.
This is an experiment in decision-making. The amount of money you earn will depend upon
the decisions you make, on the decisions other people make and random events. You will never be
asked to reveal your identity to anyone during or after the course of the experiment or after. Your
name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions private,
do not reveal your choices to any other participant. Everyone will be paid in private.
This experiment has 2 parts and your total earnings will be the sum of your payoffs in each
part.
Your earnings are given in tokens. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash based on
the exchange rate
e1 = 10 tokens.
Please do not communicate with each other during the experiment unless asked to do so. If you
have a question, feel free to raise your hand, and an experimenter will come to help you.
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Instructions Part 1
In Part 1 everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings by two artists. You will get information about
the title and artist for each painting. You will have 5 minutes to study these paintings. Then you
have another 5 minutes to analyse two additional paintings. After the five minutes you are asked
which artist painted which of the two additional paintings. Each correct answer will bring you 10
additional tokens.
After Part 1 has finished, the second part of the experiment starts.
Instructions Part 2
Part 2 of the experiment will consist of 15 periods, and in each period you will make a decision with
2 other participants and compete for a prize with a group of 3 other participants in the following
way: At the beginning of each period you will receive 100 tokens as initial endowment. Then you
can use these tokens to buy lottery tickets. Any token you invest gives one lottery ticket for the
group of 3. Any token you do not invest in lottery tickets will remain in your private token account.
Likewise, the other two participants can buy tickets for the group and the 3 other participants can
buy tickets for their group in exactly the same way.
As soon as everybody has chosen how many tickets to buy, a lottery will determine whether your
group or the other group wins a prize of 300 tokens. All bought tickets are put in a "virtual" urn.
One of the bought tickets will be randomly drawn as the winning ticket. Each ticket has the same
chance to be drawn. Hence, the more tickets your group buys, the higher is your group’s chance of
winning the prize.
Examples: If your group and the other group buy the same amount of tickets then the chance
of winning the prize is 50:50. This is also the case if none of the groups buy any tickets. If your
group buys three times as many tickets as the other group, then also your group’s chance is three
times as high as that of the other group. If only one of the groups buys tickets then this group
wins the prize with certainty.
After the winning group is determined the prize of 300 tokens is equally shared between the mem-
bers of the winning group and added to the private token accounts. As your group consists of 3
members, everyone in the winning group gets 100 tokens).
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Earnings of a member of the winning group: 100 - bought lottery tickets + 100
Earnings of a member of the losing group: 100 - bought lottery tickets
At the end of part 2 one of the 15 periods is randomly selected as the period that is paid out.
You will receive information on how much you earned in each part of the experiment and which
period was selected for the payoff in part 2.
At the end of the experiment you are asked to fill out a questionnaire.
The experiment starts with a trial period in which you will be asked to fill in some questions
in order to check your understanding of the experiment and to give you the opportunity to get
acquainted with the setup. Tokens earned in this trial period will not be paid off.
Social Identity:
Experimental Instructions
General Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions care-
fully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to
your cubicle to answer your question in private.
Talking or using mobile phones or any other electronic devices is strictly prohibited. Mobile phones
and other electronic devices should be left in the waiting room or switched off. If you are found
violating these rules, you will both forfeit any earnings from this experiment, and may be excluded
from future experiments as well.
This is an experiment in decision-making. The amount of money you earn will depend upon
the decisions you make, on the decisions other people make and random events. You will never be
asked to reveal your identity to anyone during or after the course of the experiment or after. Your
name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions private,
do not reveal your choices to any other participant. Everyone will be paid in private.
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This experiment has 2 parts and your total earnings will be the sum of your payoffs in each
part.
Your earnings are given in tokens. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash based on
the exchange rate
e1 = 10 tokens.
Please do not communicate with each other during the experiment unless asked to do so. If you
have a question, feel free to raise your hand, and an experimenter will come to help you.
You are a member of either the Blue or the Yellow group. There are 3 people in each group.
Your group assignment will remain the same throughout the experiment. That is, if you were
assigned to the Blue group, you will be in the Blue group for the rest of the experiment, and if
you were assigned to the Yellow group, you will be in the Yellow group for the rest of the experiment.
Instructions Part 1
In Part 1 everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings by two artists. You will get information about
the title and artist for each painting. You will have 5 minutes to study these paintings. Then you
have another 5 minutes to analyse two additional paintings. You may get help from other members
of your group and help other members in your group while analysing the pictures. After the five
minutes you are asked which artist painted which of the two additional paintings. Each correct
answer will bring you 10 additional tokens. Details will be provided during the experiment.
After Part 1 has finished, the second part of the experiment starts.
Instructions Part 2
Part 2 of the experiment will consist of 15 periods, and in each period your group and the other
group are competing for a prize in the following way: At the beginning of each period you will
receive 100 tokens. Then you can use these tokens to buy lottery tickets for your group. Any token
you invest gives one lottery ticket your group. Any token you do not invest in lottery tickets will
remain in your private token account. Likewise, your group members can buy tickets for your group
and the members of the other group can buy tickets for their group in exactly the same way.
As soon as everybody has chosen how many tickets to buy, a lottery will determine whether your
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group or the other group wins a prize of 300 tokens. All bought tickets are put in a "virtual" urn.
One of the bought tickets will be randomly drawn as the winning ticket. Each ticket has the same
chance to be drawn. Hence, the more tickets your group buys, the higher is your group?s chance of
winning the prize. Examples: If your group and the other group buy the same amount of tickets
then the chance of winning the prize is 50:50. This is also the case if none of the groups buy any
tickets. If your group buys three times as many tickets as the other group, then also your group’s
chance is three times as high as that of the other group. If only one of the groups buys tickets then
this group wins the prize with certainty.
If neither you nor the other players buy a ticket, then the prize is randomly allocated to one
of the players with equal chances.
After the winning group is determined the prize of 300 tokens is equally shared between the mem-
bers of the winning group and added to the private token accounts. As your group consists of 3
members, everyone in the winning group gets 100 tokens.
Earnings of a member of the winning group: 100 - bought lottery tickets + 100
Earnings of a member of the losing group: 100 - bought lottery tickets
At the end of part 2 one of the 15 periods is randomly selected as the period that is paid out.
You will receive information on how much you earned in each part of the experiment and which
period was selected for the payoff in part 2.
At the end of the experiment you are asked to fill out a questionnaire.
The experiment starts with a trial period in which you will be asked to fill in some questions
in order to check your understanding of the experiment and to give you the opportunity to get
acquainted with the setup. Tokens earned in this trial period will not be paid off.
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E.2 Experiment and Questionnaire Screens
Figure E.1: Screen 1
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Figure E.2: Screen 2
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Figure E.3: Screen 3
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Figure E.4: Screen 4
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Figure E.5: Screen 5
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Figure E.6: Screen 6
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Figure E.7: Screen 7
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Figure E.8: Screen 8
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Figure E.9: Screen 9
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Figure E.10: Screen 10
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Figure E.11: Screen 11
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Figure E.12: Screen 12
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Figure E.13: Screen 13
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Figure E.14: Screen 14
51
Figure E.15: Screen 15
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E.3 Summary Statistics and Frequency Tables
Table E.1: Study Programme Frequencies
Study Programme Control Social Identity
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
International Business 23 38.3 18 33.3
Economics 12 20.0 9 16.7
Law 7 11.7 8 14.8
University College 5 8.3 5 9.3
European Studies 3 5.0 1 1.9
Psychology 2 3.3 1 1.9
Arts and culture 0 0.0 2 3.7
Econometrics 1 1.7 0 0.0
Other 7 11.7 10 18.5
Total 60 100.0 54 100.0
Table E.2: Study Phase Frequencies
Nationality Control Social Identity
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Bachelor 47 78.3 46 85.2
Master 12 20.0 6 11.1
Research Master 0 0.0 1 1.1
Other 1 1.7 1 1.7
Total 60 100.0 54 100.0
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Table E.3: Nationality Frequencies
Nationality Control Social Identity
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
German 18 30.0 22 40.7
Dutch 12 20.0 14 25.9
Italian 5 8.3 3 5.6
British 6 10.0 1 1.9
Belgian 2 3.3 4 7.4
Polish 0 0.0 3 5.6
French 2 3.3 0 0.0
Chinese 2 3.3 0 0.0
Spanish 0 0.0 1 1.9
Other Europe 4 6.7 1 1.9
Other Asia 3 5.0 1 1.9
Other 6 10.0 4 7.4
Total 60 100.0 54 100.0
Table E.4: Strategy Frequencies
Nationality Control Social Identity
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Maximizing own payoff 38 45.8 34 42.0
Maximizing group payoff 31 37.3 32 39.5
Earn more than group members 5 6.0 5 6.2
Earn more than everybody else 3 3.6 4 4.9
Maximize overall welfare 4 4.8 2 2.5
None of the above 2 2.4 4 4.9
Total 83* 100.0 81* 100.0
*Multiple answers were possible
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Table E.5: Comparison of Control Means between treatments
Variable Control Social identity
(N=60) (N=54)
Closeness to group 4.417 5.260
(2.451) (2.324)
Communication helpful 4.981
(2.764)
Picture known 2.533 2.722
(2.645) (2.587)
Right Answer Klee 0.650 0.648
(0.481) (0.482)
Right Answer Kandinsky 0.267 0.278
(0.481) (0.452)
Number of correct answers 0.917 0.926
(0.334) (0.428)
Number of chat messages sent 6.759
(4.463)
Risk general 5.150 5.704
(1.998) (1.899)
Gender 0.633 0.611
(0.486) (0.492)
Age 21.717 21.111
(2.799) (1.7555)
Siblings 1.550 1.648
(1.096) (1.102)
Team sports 0.700 0.611
(0.462) (0.492)
Standard Deviations in parentheses
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